Renato Paes Leme
Research Scientist atGoogle Research New York
111 8th Ave, New York, NY 10011
e-mail: renatoppl [at] google [dot] com
renatoppl [at] renatoppl [dot] com
About me
I am research scientist at Google Research New York. I am broadly interested in algorithm design, specially for problems on the interface between Economics and Computation. Currently my main interests are: dynamic mechanism design (how to design good auctions over time for settings like internet advertisement), machine learning in economic environments (e.g. online learning for pricing and learning when feedback is given by strategic agents) and applications of convex programming to market optimization.You can find more about me in the following links:
Working Papers
Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance |
Online Matroid Embeddings |
Bayesian Conversations |
Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals |
LLMs at the Bargaining Table |
Publications
Charting the Shapes of Stories with Game Theory |
Swap Regret, Symmetry, and Nash Convergence in Games |
Ex-post Individually Rational Bayesian Persuasion |
Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems |
Preferences Evolve And So Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms |
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models |
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey |
Bernoulli Factories for Flow-Based Polytopes |
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?
|
U-Calibration: Forecasting for an Unknown
Agent |
Description Complexity of Regular Distributions |
Eligibility Mechanisms: Auctions Meet Information Retrieval |
Multiparameter Bernoulli Factories |
Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization |
Corruption-Robust Contextual Search through Density Updates |
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions |
Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade |
Contextual Recommendations and Low-Regret Cutting-Plane Algorithms |
Learning to Price Against a Moving Target |
Secretaries with Advice |
Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering |
Combinatorial Bernoulli Factories: Matchings, Flows and Other Polytopes |
Jointly Learning Prices and Product Features |
Auction Design for ROI-Constrained
Buyers |
Optimal Contextual Pricing and Extensions |
Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design |
Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms |
Myersonian Regression |
Bandits with Adversarial Scaling
|
Costly Zero Order Oracles |
Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions? |
Secretary Ranking with Minimal Inversions |
LP-based Approximation for Personalized
Reserve Prices |
Learning to Clear the Market |
Dynamic Contracting under Positive
Commitment |
Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest
Rates
|
Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers |
Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best |
Contextual Pricing for Lipschitz Buyers
|
Contextual Search via Intrinsic Volumes
|
Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design |
On the Construction of Substitutes |
Stochastic Bandits Robust to Adversarial
Corruptions |
Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field |
Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey |
Dynamic Revenue Sharing |
Ego-splitting Framework: from
Non-Overlapping to Overlapping Clusters |
Tight Bounds for Approximate Caratheodory
and Beyond |
Multidimensional Binary Search for
Contextual Decision-Making |
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale
Utilities |
Computing Walrasian Equilibria: Fast
Algorithms and Structural Properties |
Feature-Based Dynamic Pricing |
Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From
Learning Algorithms |
Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR
via bank accounts |
Dynamic auctions with bank accounts |
Reservation Exchange Markets for
Internet Advertisings
|
A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices |
Core-competitive Auctions
|
Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees
|
Gross Substitutes and Endowed Assignment Valuations |
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
|
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
|
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism |
Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints
|
Price Competition in Online Combinatorial Markets |
Role of Conformity in Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks |
Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
|
Clinching Auctions with Online Supply
|
Design and Analysis of Sponsored Search Mechanisms |
The Dining Bidder Problem: a la russe et a la francaise
|
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information |
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
|
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
|
On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction
|
Sequential Auctions and Externalities
|
The Curse of Simultaneity
|
GSP Auctions with Correlated Types |
Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction |
A Simpler Primal-Dual Proof of Lawler's Algorithm |
Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for GSP |
Sponsored Search Equilibria for Conservative Bidders |
Symmetry-based Completion |
Tutorials
Gross Substitutes: Combinatorial Structure
and Algorithms
|
Learning for Revenue Optimization
|
An Introduction to Bernoulli Factories |
Interactive Math
Academic Service
I serve/served as an Associate Editor of the following journals:- Operations Research (former)
- ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) (current)
- Economics and Computation: EC 2013, EC 2014, EC 2015, EC 2016, EC 2017, EC 2018, EC 2019, WINE 2019, EC 2020, EC 2021, WINE 2021, EC 2022, EC 2023, EC 2024 (Track Chair),
- Algorithms: ICALP 2019, ITCS 2022, STOC 2022,
- Artificial Intelligence: IJCAI 2013, AAMAS 2017, AAMAS 2018, DAI 2019, AAAI 2020,
- Machine Learning: ICML 2019, NeurIPS 2019, NeurIPS 2021, NeurIPS'23, ALT'24, COLT'24
- Internet Economics: Ad Auctions 2012, Ad Auctions 2013, EWSSN 2013, Ad Auctions 2015, NetEcon 2016, Ad Auctions 2016,
- AdAuctions Workshop 2014
- New York Computer Science and Economics Day 2017 (NYCE 2017)
- Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science Workshop 2017