Renato Paes Leme

Research Scientist at
Google Research New York
111 8th Ave, New York, NY 10011

e-mail: renatoppl [at] google [dot] com
                renatoppl [at] cs [dot] cornell [dot] edu




About me

I am research scientist at Google Research New York. I am broadly interested in algorithm design, specially for problems on the interface between Economics and Computation. Some topics I am particularly excited about are: mechanism design for non-quasi-linear settings, Price of Anarchy of auctions, sequential games and applications of game-theory to ad auctions.

I graduated in 2012 with a PhD in Computer Science from Cornell University, where I had the honor of being advised by Éva Tardos. After that I spent one year as a post-doc at Microsoft Research Silicon Valley working with Moshe Babaioff and Noam Nisan.

You can find more about me in the following links:

Working Papers

Gross Substitutes and Endowed Assignment Valuations
M. Ostrovsky, R. Paes Leme - pdf

Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey
R. Paes Leme - pdf (Draft, Oct 2013)

Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees
M. Babaioff, R. Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan

Publication

On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
I. Caragiannis, C. Kaklamanis, P. Kanellopoulos, M. Kyropoulou, B. Lucier, R. Paes Leme and E. Tardos
To appear in the Journal of Economic Theory (JET) - arxiv
Preliminary versions of the results in FOCS'10, EC'11 and EC'11

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
S. Dobzinski and R. Paes Leme (ICALP'14) - arxiv
Preliminary version in AAW'13 (AdAuctions Workshop)

On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, N. Nisan and R. Paes Leme (EC'14) - arxiv

Clinching Auctions Beyond Hard Budget Constraints
G. Goel, V. Mirrokni and R. Paes Leme (EC'14)
Preliminary version in AAW'13 (AdAuctions Workshop)

Price Competition in Online Combinatorial Markets
M. Babaioff, N. Nisan and R. Paes Leme (WWW'14) - arxiv

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier and R. Paes Leme (EC'13) - arxiv, slides

Clinching Auctions with Online Supply
G. Goel, V. Mirrokni and R. Paes Leme (SODA'13) - arxiv
Invited to Games and Economic Behavior (GEB special issue for FOCS/STOC/SODA'13)

Design and Analysis of Sponsored Search Mechanisms
R. Paes Leme, PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Dec 2012 - pdf, code

The Dining Bidder Problem: a la russe et a la francaise
R. Paes Leme, V. Syrgkanis and E. Tardos, (SIGecom Exchanges, Vol 11-2) - link
An expository survey on item-bidding auctions from a culinary perspective

Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information
M. Babaioff , R. Kleinberg and R. Paes Leme (EC'12) - arvix, slides

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Y. Emek , M. Feldman , I. Gamzu , R. Paes Leme and M. Tennenholtz (EC'12) - arxiv, slides
Journal version in Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
G. Goel, V. Mirrokni and R. Paes Leme (STOC'12) - arxiv, slides
Selected one of Google's Excellent Papers 2012

On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction
B. Lucier, R. Paes Leme and E. Tardos (WWW'12) - pdf, pdf-full, slides
Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in AAW'11 (AdAuctions Workshop). Here for the workshop version.

Sequential Auctions and Externalities
R. Paes Leme, V. Syrgkanis and E. Tardos (SODA'12) - pdf, arxiv

The Curse of Simultaneity
R. Paes Leme, V. Syrgkanis and E. Tardos (ITCS'12) - pdf

GSP Auctions with Correlated Types
B. Lucier and R. Paes Leme (EC'11) - pdf
Preliminary version in arXiv with title "Improved Social Welfare Bounds for GSP at Equilibrium"

Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
R. Paes Leme and E. Tardos (FOCS'10) - pdf, slides, talk
Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in AAW09 and AAW10 (AdAuctions Workshop)

A Simpler Primal-Dual Proof of Lawler's Algorithm
R. Paes Leme and D. Shmoys., Manuscript - pdf

Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for GSP
R. Paes Leme and E. Tardos (AdAuctions'10) - pdf, slides

Sponsored Search Equilibria for Conservative Bidders
R. Paes Leme and E. Tardos (AdAuctions'09) - pdf, slides

Symmetry-based Completion
T. Pereira, R. Paes Leme, L. Velho and T. Lewiner (GRAPP'09) - pdf



Academic Service

I served in the program committee of the following workshops and conferences:
Ad Auctions 2012, Ad Auctions 2013, EWSSN 2013, IJCAI 2013, EC 2013, WINE 2013, EC 2014.

I am a co-organizer of the AdAuctions Workshop 2014.